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of the rule, since the applicant was himself an agent for the defendant company,
and the "ambiguous wording" was on the back and not incorporated within the
application form, the court would seem to have extended the application of the
rule much farther than is warranted.
James K. Ferguson
INSURANCE: DOES FAILURE TO SUBMIT PROOF OF Loss WITHIN A SPECIFIED
TIME DEFEAT RECOVERY UNDER THE TER]MS OF A FIRE INSURANCE POLICY?
Assured's failure to give immediate written notice and to submit written proof
of loss to the insurance company was held, in the case of Moyer v. Merchants Fire
Insurance Company,' to prevent recovery under the terms of a policy which pro-
vided that in case of loss the assured was to give immediate written notice of that
loss and within sixty days to furnish the company with a written "Proof of Loss
signed and sworn to by the insured." There was a further provision that "No suit
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any
court of law or equity unless all the terms of this policy shall have been complied
with .... 2 There was no provision, however, which called for forfeiture of the
policy in case of non-performance of the conditions.
In her petition, plaintiff Lula E. Moyer alleged that she had notified defendant
of damage caused to plaintiff's building by a fire, and that defendant's agent per-
sonally inspected the building and examined the loss. However, there was no
evidence that plaintiff had given immediate written notice to the company of any
loss, but only that either she or her daughter called or talked to a brother who was
employed by a local agent of the company, and that she talked with someone at
the office of the Western Adjustment Company. Failure to perform these condi-
tions in the manner and within the time specified in the policy resulted in the
court's denying recovery.
On this question of submission of proof of loss, there are two distinct lines of
authority. One holds that submission of proof by the holder of the policy within
the time limit stated in the policy is a condition precedent to the right of recov
ery.3 The other line of authority, although also making the submission of proof
a condition precedent to liability, holds that failure to submit proof within the
time stipulated is not, in and of itself, fatal to the assured's recovery. Under this
second view, which represents the generally accepted rule,4 failure to submit proof
within the time stipulated will not avoid the policy or work a forfeiture, in the
absence of a provision to that effect in the policy.
1133 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio Common Pl. 1952), afI'd, 134 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
2 It will be noted that this wording is in conformity with the 1943 form of the New York
standard fire insurance policy which changed the 1918 form by substituting the word "unless"
for the word "until". NEW YORK INsuRAxcE LAW, § 168, as added by c. 671, LAWS 1943, effec-
tive July 1, 1943.
3 See, e.g., San Francisco Savings Union v. Western Assur. Co., 157 Fed. 695 (N.D. Calif.
1907); W ite v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 131, 60 Pac. 666 (1900).
4 See, e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y. v. Raleigh Hardware Co., 62 F.2d 705
(4th Cir. 1933) ; Indian River Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 46 Fla. 283, 35 So. 228 (1903) ;
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Owens, 69 Kan. 602, 77 Pac. 544 (1904); Steele v. German Ins. Co.,
93 Mich. 81, 53 N.W. 514 (1892); Northern Assur. Co. v. Hanna, 60 Neb. 29, 82 N.W. 97
(1900) ; Nance v. Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co., 31 Okla. 208, 120 Pac. 948 (1912) ; Dakin v. Queen
City Fire Ins. Co., 59 Ore. 269, 117 Pac. 419 (1911); North British Ins. Co. v. Edmundson,
104 Va. 486, 52 S.E. 350 (1905) ; Raleigh Hardware Co. v. Williams, 106 W.Va. 85, 144 S.E.
879 (1928); Welch v. Fire Ass'n, 120 Wis. 456, 98 N.W. 227 (1904).
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In the case of Smith Insurance Agency v. Hamilton Insurance Company,5 the
only ground upon which the defendant insurance company denied liability was
that proof of loss had not been rendered to it within the time stipulated by the
terms of the policy. Holding for plaintiff, the court said:
"The policy does provide that the insured shall furnish the proofs of loss within
sixty days after the fire, unless the time be extended by the company. But there is no
provision forfeiting the policy for failure to comply with this requirement." [Where
there is no forfeiture clause] " . . . failure to furnish such proof of loss within the
given time does not wholly destroy all right of recovery, but only delays right of
action; but action upon it cannot be brought until such proof is furnished."8
As between the decision of the Moyer case and that of the Smith case, it would
seem that the latter is the more realistic approach to the problem.
The purpose of the notice of loss is to acquaint the insurer with the fact that
a loss has occurred and to permit it the opportunity of making a proper investiga-
tion. The giving of proof of loss is a more formal requirement designed not alone
to allow the insurer the opportunity to determine the extent of its liability, but
also to afford it a means of detecting any fraud that might have been perpetrated
upon it. It is therefore greatly to the insurer's advantage, if there is any question
or doubt as to the validity of the claim of loss, to have the proof submitted within
the specified time. But a late submission of the proof does not deny the insurer an
opportunity of determining the extent of its liability, nor does such late submission
render impossible the detection of fraud. Consequently, it does not follow that a
late submission of proof of loss should work to avoid the policy. Yet, the courts
of New York, for example, hold that failure to submit written proof within the
time specified in the policy results in forfeiture. To emphasize this fact and obviate
the possibility of a different interpretation being put forth by an assured, the word
"unless" in the 1943 fire insurance policy form provided by statute in New York
was substituted for the word "until" as previously used in the 1918 form in the
phrase "No suit or action ... shall be sustainable ... until all the terms of this
policy shall have been complied with .... '"7 While the word "until" might imply
that a suit could be maintained after the proof is submitted, even though it was
late, it was felt the word "unless" would clearly rule out the possibility of that
interpretation.
In Peabody v. Satterlee,8 a case requiring that written proof of loss be sub-
mitted within sixty days, plaintiff mailed the proof within that time but it was
not received by the insurer until after the sixty days had elapsed. The facts in this
case showed that the proof of loss was drawn up by a Mr. Hawley as attorney in
fact for the assured, and mailed thirty-two days after the loss by fire had occurred.
The insurer rejected this proof thirty-nine days after the loss as not having been
executed, signed, and sworn to by the assured in accordance with the terms of the
policy. Fifty-nine days after the loss occurred, the assured sent the properly exe-
cuted proof of loss by registered mail to the insurer who received it sixty-one days
after the loss had taken place. Finding for defendants, the court held:
"A condition of a fire policy, requiring insured to furnish proofs of loss within a certain
time, is broken when the insurer does not receive them until after such time, though
insured mailed them before the time had expired."0
5 69 W.Va. 129, 71 S.E. 194 (1911).6 1d. at 131, 71 S.E. at 196.
7 VANcE, LAW OF INSURANCE, § 161, pp. 899, 901 (3d ed. 1951).
8 166 N.Y. 174, 59 N.E. 818 (1901).
9 Id. at 174, 59 N.E. at 818.
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California follows this rule, and in a case in which the policy in question pro-
vided that no suit was to be brought until the terms of the policy were complied
with, the court held that failure to perform in time caused forfeiture, even though
the policy contained no forfeiture clause.' 0 After discussing the various construc-
tions given by the courts to the words "until" and "unless", the California court
indicated that it could see no real difference in meaning between them, stating:
"It would seem to require a microscopic inspection to discover a substantial differ-
ence in [their] meaning... !'i1
The California Insurance Code, Section 550, reads:
"In case of loss upon an insurance policy against fire, an insurer is exonerated if
notice thereof is not'given to him without unnecessary delay by an insured or some
person entitled to the benefit of the insurance."
Also, the California standard fire insurance policy form, adopted in 1949 and
amended in 1950, has the sixty-day provision for proof of loss in writing to be
rendered to the insurer, and also provides that:
"No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been
complied with ....- 12
As can be seen by these three samples, California, as well as New York, follows
the minority rule which requires strict compliance with the provisions of the policy
as regards notice and submission of proof of loss within the stipulated time, failure
to meet these requirements resulting in a forfeiture.
It would seem that those courts denying recovery have resolved the problem
of proof of loss in an unnecessarily harsh manner. Agents are very often deemed
and represented by insurance companies to be "friends of the family" and as per-
sons who will be of assistance in the event of emergencies. If these representations
are true, then it would appear that these provisions requiring written notice, and
the manner in which they must be prepared to be acceptable to the company,
should be carefully explained to the assured to obviate the possibility of forfeiture
for failure to perform a simple ministerial function. What is being exchanged in
these aleatory contracts in the payment of the premium for the insurer's accept-
ance of the risk of loss. When a loss arises, it would seem that the high ideals of
justice are not being faithfully and honorably served where courts permit the
insurer to escape liability on the sole basis of the assured's unfortunate omission
to perform a technical requirement that is easily overlooked, the failure more often
than not arising out of the assured's inability to understand the terms of the policy,
or his ignorance of the importance and purpose of the condition. This does not
mean to deny the insurer his right to require more than merely the payment of the
premium in exchange for his acceptance of the risk of loss, but it does mean to
suggest that courts and legislatures should either: 1) consider substantial per-
formance of the terms of the contract (as required in construction contracts, for
example)13 as sufficient, or 2) unless there has been some effort, beyond the mere
handing over of the policy, on the part of the insurer to explain orally to the assured
what these conditions mean and how they are to be performed in the event of loss,
10 White v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 131, 60 Pac. 666 (1900).
11 Ibd
12 CAr0&oRpA INsuRANcE CODE, § 2071 (1950).
Is Rowe v. Gerry, 112 App. Div. 358, 98 N.Y. Supp. 380 (1906).
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